The Effect of Selective INS Monitoring Strategies on the Industrial Employment Choice and Earnings of Recent Immigrants

Alberto Davila and Jose A Pagan

Economic Inquiry, 1997, vol. 35, issue 1, pages 138-50

Abstract: One effect of 1986's immigration reform was to make INS inspection of farms more costly relative to other industries. In response, the authors suggest, the INS refocused its enforcement efforts toward industries with a higher concentration of illegals per establishment, especially manufacturing. They test this hypothesis and model the effects of a selective monitoring strategy on the employment choice and wages of illegal workers. The authors find evidence of selective monitoring by the INS and that this policy has redistributed illegal workers from closely to weakly monitored industries. Specifically, they find a shift from the higher-paying manufacturing sector to the agricultural. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Oxford University Press
Address: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().