The Effects of Discretionary Federal Spending on Parliamentary Election Results

Thomas A. Evans

Economic Inquiry, 2006, vol. 44, issue 2, pages 234-248

Abstract: Parliamentary rules make it difficult for opposition members of Parliament to influence government spending. As the electorate is aware of this situation discretionary federal spending is expected to affect vote-share differently for majority and opposition incumbents. Consistent estimators yield positive and significant point estimates for the impact of increases in spending for majority incumbents in Canadian federal elections yet yield negative but insignificant point estimates for opposition incumbents. Furthermore, $100 additional federal spending per capita in an electoral district is estimated to increase majority candidates' vote-share, regardless of incumbency, by between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points. (JEL D72, H59) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: D72 H59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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