Tracking Customer Search to Price Discriminate

Cary A. Deck and Bart J. Wilson ()

Economic Inquiry, 2006, vol. 44, issue 2, pages 280-295

Abstract: The electronic technologies of the Internet make it possible for sellers to track potential customers and discriminate between the informed and uninformed. In this article, we report an experiment that investigates the market impact of firms tracking customers and offering discriminatory prices based on search history. We find that consumers, on average, face the same prices when sellers have the ability to track customers and price discriminate as when sellers post a single price for all buyers. However, informed buyers receive lower prices when sellers can detect buyer search, whereas uninformed buyers receive lower prices when firms cannot track customers. (JEL D43, L13, C92) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: D43 L13 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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