Shirking on the Court: Testing for the Incentive Effects of Guaranteed Pay

David J. Berri () and Anthony C. Krautmann

Economic Inquiry, 2006, vol. 44, issue 3, pages 536-546

Abstract: Prior work on long-term contracts and the incentive to shirk has focused almost exclusively on Major League Baseball. The current inquiry is the first to examine shirking in the National Basketball Association. We employed two different measures of player productivity. When the NBA's measure is used, we find evidence consistent with allegations of shirking behavior. But when productivity is measured in a fashion more consistent with economists' definition of marginal product, the evidence of shirking evaporates. (JEL J41, J44, L83) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: J41 J44 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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