Private Interest Support for Efficiency Enhancing Antitrust Policies

James M. Buchanan and Dwight R Lee

Economic Inquiry, 1992, vol. 30, issue 2, pages 218-24

Abstract: Recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real, as opposed to the stated, purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition. Yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition. The authors argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition. Indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1992
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