Antitrust Policy and Mergers: The Wealth Effect of Supreme Court Decisions

Abagail McWilliams (), Thomas A Turk and Asghar Zardkoohi

Economic Inquiry, 1993, vol. 31, issue 4, pages 517-33

Abstract: Many believe that antitrust policy has had a dramatic impact on merger strategies in the United States. For this to be true, enforcement of antitrust laws must affect a wide range of firms, not just those firms whose mergers are contested. This study tests whether or not firms engaged in uncontested mergers are affected by antitrust enforcement, as signaled by Supreme Court decisions. Using event study methodology, the authors find that antitrust policy against mergers was binding during the 1960s and 1970s as it lowered the value of targets in uncontested ongoing mergers. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1993

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:31:y:1993:i:4:p:517-33

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Oxford University Press
Address: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().