Majoritarian Management of the Commons

James M. Buchanan and Yong J Yoon

Economic Inquiry, 2001, vol. 39, issue 3, pages 396-405

Abstract: This article analyzes usage of a common property resource, "the commons," under collectivization as compared with more familiar privatization institutional arrangements. Particular emphasis is on majority decision rules. When separate majority coalitions may authorize simultaneous usage of a common resource, total value is dissipated, but the interdependencies introduced by possible membership in differing coalitions to an extent reduce the incentives for exploitation. The formal analysis is analogous to that familiar in Cournot-Nash duopoly-oligopoly models but with differing efficiency implications. The argument has relevance for differential-benefit public spending from general tax sources, as well as other applications. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 2001
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