Comments on 'Perspective on Financial Regulation and Liberalisation in Africa under Incentive Problems and Asymmetric Information.'

Alan Gelb

Journal of African Economies, 1997, vol. 6, issue 1, pages 89-99

Abstract: This wide-ranging paper provides an extensive analysis of "agency problems" endemic to financial systems, particularly in countries where: economic information is limited, market institutions are weak (including those needed to enforce contracts), and governments intervene extensively in economic activities. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:6:y:1997:i:1:p:89-99

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of African Economies is edited by Marcel Fafchamps

More articles in Journal of African Economies from Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE)
Address: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Oxford University Press ().