The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness

Sylvester Eijffinger () and Marco Hoeberichts ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 1998, vol. 50, issue 3, pages 397-411

Abstract: This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independence in a monetary policy game with a conservative central banker. It tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political determinants, both theoretically and empirically. There appears to be a trade-off between central bank independence and conservativeness. Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence with the actual degree of independence, the authors want to identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for twelve member states of the European Union. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness (1996)
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