The voluntary provision of a pure public good and the Montreal Protocol: behavioral and data concerns

James C. Murdoch () and Todd Sandler ()

Oxford Economic Papers, 2009, vol. 61, issue 1, pages 197-200

Abstract: This article argues that the World Resources Institute (WRI) data are appropriate for our game-theoretic-based analysis of countries' CFC emission cutbacks prior to the ratification of the Protocol. Given the underlying game from which our reduced-form equations follow, the policymakers must be viewed as responding to contemporary information, which was the WRI dataset. The article also addresses the issue of an alleged perfect correlation being induced between CFC emission cutbacks and GNP due to the imputation process used by WRI. The article also raises concerns about inventory inclusion in the United Nations Environmental Programme data that could distort cutbacks for major producer countries that were likely to stockpile CFCs before production lines were shifted over to CFC substitutes. Copyright 2009 , Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpn022 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:61:y:2009:i:1:p:197-200

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Economic Papers is edited by A. Banerjee and James Forder

More articles in Oxford Economic Papers from Oxford University Press
Address: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().