Abstract:
In contrast to previous literature, we argue that are two types of poorly performing firms going private through a leveraged buyout (LBO). One group consists of firms in which managers own an insignificant fraction of their firm's stock and are vulnerable to a hostile takeover. The other group consists of firms in which managers own a significant fraction of their firm's stock and so face little risk of hostile takeover. Our evidence indicates that there are two such groups of LBOs and that their motivations and posttransaction actions are different. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
Review of Financial Studies is edited by Maureen O'Hara
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