¿PREMIAN LAS TARIFAS EL DESEMPEÑO DEL TRANSPORTISTA?

Marcos Singer (), Patricio Carlos Donoso () and Sven Widdel ()
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Sven Widdel: Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Abante, 2007, vol. 10, issue 1, pages 21-55

Abstract: We develop an agency model subject to moral hazard to evaluate whether delivery prices reward carriers for their performance, or arbitrarily benefit some carriers and harm others. From the model, we derive several propositions that we test on a panel data of 58 carriers that work for a shipper in Santiago, over 93 weeks. We verify that the shipper rewards the experience, fleet size and service quality provided by the carrier, but not the quality of the trucks. The carrier has incentives to visit many clients, but not to travel longer distances. We also confirm that prices are sensitive to the alternatives to the agreement between the shipper and the carrier. However, a number of carriers are over or under compensated for no apparent reason.

Keywords: Freight transportation; Agency relationship; Incentives; Chile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L24 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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