UNA INTRODUCCION A LA TEORIA Y LA PRACTICA DE LAS SUBASTAS

Marcos Singer ()

Abante, 2002, vol. 5, issue 1, pages 3-29

Abstract: While auctions gain relevance as a trading mechanism, different events show how unskilled many firms and governments are when using them. The objective of this article is to familiarize the reader with the auction theory, either to improve the auction design, if he is the auctioneer, or to orient the bidding strategy, if he is the bidder. First, we present the simplest auctions, using intuitive mathematical tools. Then, we consider more realistic setups, such as the existence of risk aversion, and the use of reservation prices. We also study the case where the goods auctioned can be later traded on the market, and those auctions where bidders can benefit from economies of complementarities if they are granted with specific bundles of goods. In both cases, the auctioneer must recognize the risks and opportunities, in order to maximize the economic value of the allocation of goods.

Keywords: Auction; Winner’s curse; Combinatorial auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 Y20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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