DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC GOOD IN BANKING VERSUS STATE INTERVENTION
Piotr Masiukiewicz ()
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Piotr Masiukiewicz: Warsaw School of Economics, Poland
Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, 2015, vol. 10, issue 1, pages 55-67
This article has the following thesis: changes in banking and the role of banks in real economy in recent years give an argument for treating banks as a public good. Banks received great support from governments as a result of the subprime crisis. G-20 and European Commission recommended new regulations for this sector after the crisis. As a consequence of banking development, more than 90% of the population use banking services in many countries. New social functions of banks have appeared. Doctrines about recovery and government support for banks were changed in parallel (e.g. LoLR). Presently, there are some arguments for recognition of public good doctrine in banking such as: a very big area for state regulation, state banking supervision, state system of deposits insurance, realization of task delegated by the state, social responsibility of banks and others. These arguments confirm that banks’ activity has a particular importance for the society and the economy, and would be public good.
Keywords: bankruptcy; bank; crisis; financial institution; public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pes:ierequ:v:10:y:2015:i:1:p:55-67
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