A simple example of a stochastic games with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of discount factors, including those close to me, equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium for large discount factors is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium for low discount factors. A unique cyclic equilibrium is also possible for intermediate ranges of discount factors. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Related works: Working Paper: The Castle on the Hill (2000) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.