Optimal Capital Taxation and Labor Market Search

David Domeij ()

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2005, vol. 8, issue 3, pages 623-650

Abstract: In this paper I study the nature of optimal factor income taxation in a neoclassical growth model where search frictions on the labor marker generate unemployment. I show that the introduction of search frictions changes the Chamley-Judd result of zero capital taxation as follows: if the government is constrained to capital and labor taxation, the optimal capital tax is in general non-zero, but if the government has access to other tax instruments the Chamley.Judd result survives. Quantitatively, the optimal capital tax is small, in the range of -8 to 8 percent. The welfare costs of being constrained can, however, be quite large. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: Optimal taxation; Search externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 J40 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2005.01.011 Full text (application/pdf)
Access to full texts is restricted to ScienceDirect subscribers and ScienceDirect institutional members. See http://www.sciencedirect.com/ for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:issued:v:8:y:2005:i:3:p:623-650

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/RED17.htm

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Dynamics is edited by Gianluca Violante

More articles in Review of Economic Dynamics from Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics
Address: Review of Economic Dynamics Academic Press Editorial Office 525 "B" Street, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().