Optimal Oil Taxation in a Small Open Economy

Carlos de Miguel and Baltasar Manzano ()

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 3, pages 438-454

Abstract: The international oil market has been very volatile over the past three decades. In industrialized economies, especially in Europe, taxes represent a large fraction of oil prices and governments do not seem to react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. The aim of this paper is to analyze optimal oil taxation in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy that imports oil. We find that in general it is not optimal to distort the oil price paid by firms with taxes, neither in the long run nor over the business cycle. The general result could be reversed depending on environmental considerations and available fiscal instruments. We provide simulations to illustrate the optimal response to shocks in such cases. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: Optimal oil taxation; general equilibrium; small open economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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