El poder de voto en el Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud

Sandra Milena Rodríguez A. ()
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Sandra Milena Rodríguez A.: Universidad del Norte

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2007, vol. 9, issue 16, pages 223-253

Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical conceptualization of Colombia’s National Council of Health Social Security (CNSSS). Using a simple framework of theory of games, it analyzes the voting power of its members, and estimates the indexes of Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and Coleman. It shows that the Council’s decisions respond to a false consensus that reveals the interests of particular agents. It concludes that power indexes are sensitive to the election of the majority approval quota and that the proportion of votes does not clearly show the Council members’ power.

Keywords: agency relationships; power index; coalition; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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