Economía política y finanzas públicas: teoría, evidencia y resultados de laboratorio

Javier A. Gutierrez, Carolina Guzmán and Ulpiano J. Jiménez
Additional contact information
Javier A. Gutierrez: Secretaría de Hacienda de Bogotá
Carolina Guzmán: Secretaría de Hacienda de Bogotá
Ulpiano J. Jiménez: Secretaría de Hacienda de Bogotá

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2000, vol. 2, issue 3, pages 104-148

Abstract: This paper summarizes theoretical models and empirical evidence concerning political economy of public finances. It emphasizes political and institutional issues that influence different levels of public debt and fiscal deficits in countries and subnational entities with similar economic performance, and describes fiscal contract relationships between governors and voters using principal-agent theory. It then applies methods of experimental economics and game theory, to evaluate how these relationships contribute in debt accumulation and fiscal unbalances, in a laboratory experiment in which participants act as agents (governors) and then as principals (voters).

Keywords: experimental economics; public finances; fiscal deficit; principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstituci ... pers/jgutierrez3.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:104-148

Access Statistics for this article

Revista de Economía Institucional is edited by Alberto Supelano

More articles in Revista de Economía Institucional from Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía
Address: Cra. 1 No. 12-68 Casa de las Mandolinas
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Carolina Hernández ().