¿Qué tan racional es el principio de racionalidad de Popper?

Boris Salazar ()
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Boris Salazar: Universidad del Valle

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2001, vol. 3, issue 5, pages 52-77

Abstract: This paper shows the relevance of Popper's Rationality Principle (RP) for the appraisal of the impressive mass work emerging, in recent years, in the fields of rationality, learning, evolutionary games and behavioral economic theory. In contradistinction to the well-known rigid criteria of the falsacionist Popper, the RP covers a large and diverse spectrum of behaviors compatible with the minimal idea of ‘acting in accordance with the situation’. Its relevance to understand the formation of social conventions or how agents learn ‘to play Nash equilibrium’ is argued at length here.

Keywords: rationality; economic methodology; evolutionary games; social conventions; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 D79 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:3:y:2001:i:5:p:52-77

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