Riesgo moral y contratos: cierta evidencia experimental

Julian Arévalo and Jair Ojeda ()

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2004, vol. 6, issue 10, pages 47-69

Abstract: This paper shows one type of asymmetric information problems, their theoretical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.

Keywords: moral risk; contracts; experimental evidence; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C90 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Related works:
Working Paper: Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:6:y:2004:i:10:p:47-69

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