Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos

Frédéric Boehm ()

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2005, vol. 7, issue 13, pages 245-263

Abstract: Regulation plays a key part in public service reforms. However, corruption and the risk of capture may undermine the purposes of these reforms. Both cost and incentive based regulations carry corruption and capture risks. This document shows that capture is a minor problem compared with market failures in different sectors, and thus proposes reforms to generate transparency and accountability in the regulatory processes.

Keywords: corruption; capture; regulation; public services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 D73 D72 L97 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:7:y:2005:i:13:p:245-263

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