The Securities Industry under Negotiated Brokerage Commissions: Changes in the Structure and Performance of New York Stock Exchange Member Firms

Seha M. Tinic and Richard R. West

Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, vol. 11, issue 1, pages 29-41

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of competitive brokerage commission rates on the structure and performance of the NYSE brokerage industry. Although the demise of fixed minimum commission rates has caused economic hardship for a number of brokerage firms, the results to date do not support the negative public policy effects that were alleged to be the inexorable consequences of permitting brokerage rates to be set by competitive pressures.

Date: 1980
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