The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm

David Easley () and Maureen O'Hara

Bell Journal of Economics, 1983, vol. 14, issue 2, pages 531-538

Abstract: This article demonstrates that the partitioning of economic activity into for-profit and nonprofit organizations can be at least partially described as the solution to an optimal contracting problem. We show that nonprofit firms may be superior to for-profit firms if the output cannot be costlessly observed.

Date: 1983
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