Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Pretrial Negotiation

Jeong-Yoo Kim

RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, vol. 27, issue 4, pages 787-802

Abstract: Infinitely repeated interaction between a defendant and a plaintiff can enhance the credibility of cheap talk and improve efficiency in outcomes that would be feasible without cheap talk. The basic driving force is reputation effect. If t he players are concerned about their reputation, cheap talk cannot be taken as meaningless even in a game where the interests of the players are sufficiently conflicting, because possible current gains from opportunistic behavior can be wiped out by future losses in payoff from damaged.

Date: 1996
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%2819962 ... O%3B2-U&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Series data maintained by ().