Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence

Gerald D. Gay, Martin F. Grace (), Jayant R. Kale and Thomas H. Noe ()

RAND Journal of Economics, 1989, vol. 20, issue 2, pages 196-213

Abstract: In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode on the judicial process. In a sequential signalling game setting, we model a criminal trial using varying assumptions regarding the sophistication of the agents, while maintaining the assumption that the information processing of juries is noisier than that of judges. We demonstrate that under certain sets of assumptions, more defendants may choose a jury trial, even though the equilibrium conviction rate is higher. This and other hypotheses suggested by our analysis are tested on a sample of actual trial results.

Date: 1989
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