Worksharing: A Calibrated Model

Etienne Billette de Villemeur (), Helmuth Cremer (), Francois Boldron and Bernard Roy
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Francois Boldron: La Poste
Bernard Roy: La Poste

Review of Network Economics, 2008, vol. 7, issue 2, pages 272-293

Abstract: This paper studies the price structure in a postal sector with a monopolistic operator when customers can engage in worksharing. It presents simulation results obtained from an empirical model that is calibrated on data from the French postal sector. The optimal worksharing discount is significantly larger than the avoided costs. Consequently, the appropriate pricing structure differs markedly from the often recommended ECPR policy.

Keywords: Postal Sector; Worksharing; Calibration and Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rne:rneart:v:7:y:2008:i:2:p:272-293

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