Regolamentazione parziale di quantità

Etienne Billette de Villemeur () and Annalisa Vinella ()

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2007, vol. 97, issue 4, pages 79-114

Abstract: Public utilities have recently undergone a major process of reorganization. Competitive segments have been liberalized, (eventually) privatised and tend to evolve into partially regulated oligopo-lies. In the latter, former monopolists are subject to regulatory duties whereas competitors operate unregulated, although endowed with market power. Having these scenarios in mind, we propose a mechanism of partial regulation that is suitable for private Cournot oligopolies. Iterated over time, this scheme, which relies upon data about current costs and past performance, converges to the equilibrium of a Nash-Cournot mixed oligopoly.

JEL-codes: L51 L97 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:97:y:2007:i:4:p:79-114

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