Regulation in a political economy: explaining limited commitment and the ratchet effect

Economics of Governance, 2000, vol. 1, issue 3, pages 181-197

Keywords: JEL classification: D82; G38; Key words: endogenous limited commitment; renegotiation; short run contracts; contractual incompleteness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:181-197

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Economics of Governance is edited by Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad

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