Rational probation decisions for juvenile delinquents

Oliver Fabel () and Volker Meier ()

Economics of Governance, 2002, vol. 3, issue 3, pages 249-274

Abstract: Assuming a risk of innocent conviction and fully rational individuals, the current study addresses the effects of immediate punishment and probation rules. Strict dominance of a probation rule requires that the judicial system is highly unreliable and, at the same time, learning over criminal careers is strong. Else, an optimal punishment scheme can always be based on either regularly offering probation or appropriate immediate punishments. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Keywords: Key words: Juvenile crime; probation; optimal punishment.; JEL Classification: K14; K42. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s101010100044 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:249-274

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Access Statistics for this article

Economics of Governance is edited by Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad

More articles in Economics of Governance from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F Baum ().