A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations

Johan N. M. Lagerlöf ()

Economics of Governance, 2007, vol. 8, issue 3, pages 197-218

Keywords: Rent seeking; Competition; Lobbying; Information acquisition; Disclosure; Welfare; D42; D43; D72; D83; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations (2006)
Working Paper: A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations (2006)
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