Economic Theory

1991 - 2010

Edited by Nichoals Yanneils

from Springer
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Infinite-horizon choice functions pp. 1-21: Geir Asheim, Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont and Kotaro Suzumura
Multi-activity contests pp. 23-43: Maria Arbatskaya and Hugo Mialon
Aggregative games and best-reply potentials pp. 45-66: Martin Jensen
Dismissals and quits in repeated games pp. 67-80: Pablo Casas-Arce
Foundations for contest success functions pp. 81-98: Luis Corchón and Matthias Dahm
First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model pp. 99-141: J. Reiß and Jens Schöndube

Continuous time one-dimensional asset-pricing models with analytic price–dividend functions pp. 461-503: Yu Chen, Thomas Cosimano and Alex Himonas
New unit-consistent intermediate inequality indices pp. 505-521: Coral Río and Olga Alonso-Villar
Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry pp. 523-538: Antonio Miralles
A contraction principle for finite global games pp. 539-563: Laurent Mathevet
Self-organized agglomerations and transport costs pp. 565-589: Pierre Picard and Takatoshi Tabuchi
Private information, transferable utility, and the core pp. 591-609: S. Flåm and L. Koutsougeras

Introduction pp. 271-273: Victor Chernozhukov, Pierre-André Chiappori and Marc Henry
Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types pp. 275-315: Ivar Ekeland
Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness pp. 317-354: Pierre-André Chiappori, Robert McCann and Lars Nesheim
Optimal transportation and the falsifiability of incompletely specified economic models pp. 355-374: Ivar Ekeland, Alfred Galichon and Marc Henry
Optimal partition of a large labor force into working pairs pp. 375-395: Robert McCann and Maxim Trokhimtchouk
Matching for teams pp. 397-418: G. Carlier and I. Ekeland
Rearranging Edgeworth–Cornish–Fisher expansions pp. 419-435: Victor Chernozhukov, Ivan Fernandez-Val and Alfred Galichon
Notes on optimal transportation pp. 437-459: Ivar Ekeland

Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium pp. 1-7: Bernhard Stengel
Enumeration of Nash equilibria for two-player games pp. 9-37: David Avis, Gabriel Rosenberg, Rahul Savani and Bernhard Stengel
Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games pp. 39-54: Anne Balthasar
Finding all Nash equilibria of a finite game using polynomial algebra pp. 55-96: Ruchira Datta
A decomposition algorithm for N-player games pp. 97-117: Srihari Govindan and Robert Butler Wilson
Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory pp. 119-156: P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters
Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games pp. 157-173: Ravi Kannan and Thorsten Theobald
Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game pp. 175-192: Peter Miltersen and Troels Sørensen
Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective pp. 193-236: Tim Roughgarden
Computing uniformly optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games pp. 237-253: Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille
Computing sequential equilibria using agent quantal response equilibria pp. 255-269: Theodore Turocy

Migration with local public goods and the gains from changing places pp. 359-377: Peter Hammond and Jaume Sempere
Consumer choice and revealed bounded rationality pp. 379-392: Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts pp. 393-410: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina Klaus
Monotone imitation pp. 411-441: Carlos Oyarzun and Johannes Ruf
Monetary policy and multiple equilibria with constrained investment and externalities pp. 443-463: Baruch Gliksberg
Fair welfare maximization pp. 465-494: Ashish Goel, Adam Meyerson and Thomas Weber
Non-asymptotic tests of model performance pp. 495-514: Sylvain Chassang
A note on the existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models pp. 515-522: Jean Derks and Martijn Tennekes

Exactly what happens after the Anscombe–Aumann race? pp. 175-212: Marie-Louise Vierø
Single-peaked choice pp. 213-230: Walter Bossert and Hans Peters
Risk and risk aversion when states of nature matter pp. 231-246: Jan Werner
Giffen behavior independent of the wealth level pp. 247-267: Junko Doi, Kazumichi Iwasa and Koji Shimomura
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights pp. 269-296: Helmut Bester
Sustainability and its relation to efficiency under uncertainty pp. 297-315: Frank C. Krysiak
Robust rational turnout pp. 317-343: Tasos Kalandrakis
Group contest success functions pp. 345-357: Johannes Münster

Introduction: ‘New directions in international trade theory’ pp. 1-3: Daniel M. Bernhofen and Raymond G. Riezman
Predicting the pattern of international trade in the neoclassical model: a synthesis pp. 5-21: Daniel M. Bernhofen
Tariff reforms with rigid wages pp. 23-39: Rod Falvey and Udo Kreickemeier
Multilateral subsidy games pp. 41-66: Dermot Leahy and J. Peter Neary
A two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model with physical and human capital accumulation pp. 67-84: Yunfang Hu, Murray Kemp and Koji Shimomura
Paths of efficient self-enforcing trade agreements pp. 85-104: Eric W. Bond
Does trade foster contract enforcement? pp. 105-130: James Anderson
Exploring policy options in joint intertemporal-spatial trade models using an incomplete markets approach pp. 131-145: Hui Huang, John Whalley and Shunming Zhang
Free trade: what are the terms-of-trade effects? pp. 147-161: Carsten Kowalczyk and Raymond G. Riezman
Competitive trade models and real world features pp. 163-174: Ronald Jones and Sugata Marjit