Economic Theory

1991 - 2010

Edited by Nichoals Yanneils

from Springer
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A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games pp. 357-394: Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy pp. 395-416: Erwan Quintin
On the nonexistence of recursive equilibrium in stochastic OLG economies pp. 417-437: Alessandro Citanna and Paolo Siconolfi
Consumption externalities: a representative consumer model when agents are heterogeneous pp. 439-467: Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa and Stephen J Turnovsky
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials pp. 469-490: Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Benny Moldovanu
Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models pp. 491-507: Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi
On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents pp. 509-519: Harold Houba and Quan Wen
Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information pp. 521-532: Haifeng Fu
A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games pp. 533-542: Bertrand Tchantcho and Lawrence Diffo Lambo

On the completeness of complete markets pp. 171-201: P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Kirsten I.M. Rohde
Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model pp. 203-241: Subir Bose, Gerhard Orosel, Marco Ottaviani and Lise Vesterlund
On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships pp. 243-265: Frank Gigler and Thomas Hemmer
Petty corruption pp. 267-280: Seung Han Yoo
An ascending double auction pp. 281-306: Michael Peters and Sergei Severinov
Task scheduling and moral hazard pp. 307-320: Tymofiy Mylovanov and Patrick W. Schmitz
Existence of solutions in continuous-time optimal growth models pp. 321-333: Hippolyte d’Albis, Pascal Gourdel and Cuong Le Van
Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game pp. 335-345: Rodrigo Harrison and Roberto Muñoz
Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations pp. 347-356: Toyotaka Sakai

General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection pp. 1-29: Aldo Rustichini and Paolo Siconolfi
Optimal balanced growth in a general multi-sector endogenous growth model with constant returns pp. 31-49: Harutaka Takahashi
Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game pp. 51-80: Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies pp. 81-98: Toshiyuki Hirai
The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition pp. 99-118: Camelia Bejan
Preferences over location-scale family pp. 119-146: Wing-Keung Wong and Chenghu Ma
Nash equilibria with Knightian uncertainty; the case of capacities pp. 147-159: Dionysius Glycopantis and Allan Muir
On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes pp. 161-169: Sunanda Roy and Tarun Sabarwal

Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation pp. 337-351: Edi Karni
Strategic saving decisions in the infinite-horizon model pp. 353-377: Gerhard Sorger
The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing pp. 379-405: Herve Moulin
Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models pp. 407-433: Ludovic Renou
Human capital accumulation and output growth in a stochastic environment pp. 435-452: Keith Blackburn and Dimitrios Varvarigos
Controlling a biological invasion: a non-classical dynamic economic model pp. 453-469: Lars Olson and Santanu Roy
Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain pp. 471-502: Abdelkrim SEGHIR and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez
Note on the non-existence of sunspot equilibrium pp. 503-513: Takeshi Momi

Utility of gambling II: risk, paradoxes, and data pp. 165-187: R. Luce, C. Ng, A. Marley and János Aczél
Two-persons efficient risk-sharing and equilibria for concave law-invariant utilities pp. 189-223: G. Carlier and R. Dana
Preference densities and social choices pp. 225-238: Marcel Richter and Kam-Chau Wong
Bankruptcy and firm finance pp. 239-266: Stefan Krasa, Tridib Sharma and Anne Villamil
Manipulation of endowments and sunspot equilibria pp. 267-282: Aditya Goenka and Stefano Matta
Minimum quality standards and consumers’ information pp. 283-302: Paolo Giorgio Garella and Emmanuel Petrakis
Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case pp. 303-325: Peter Hammond and Yeneng Sun
Differentiating ambiguity: an expository note pp. 327-336: Jürgen Eichberger, Simon Grant and David Kelsey

Utility of gambling I: entropy modified linear weighted utility pp. 1-33: R. Luce, C. Ng, A. Marley and János Aczél
Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility pp. 35-55: Yeneng Sun and Nicholas Yannelis
A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis pp. 57-80: Takahiro Watanabe and Takehiko Yamato
Living with ambiguity: prices and survival when investors have heterogeneous preferences for ambiguity pp. 81-108: Scott Condie
Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem pp. 109-128: Alex Robson and Stergios Skaperdas
Weighted approval voting pp. 129-146: Jordi Masso and Marc Vorsatz
Expected utility inequalities: theory and applications pp. 147-158: Eduardo Zambrano
Preferences over characteristics and utility functions over commodities pp. 159-164: Aldo Rustichini and Paolo Siconolfi