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Economic Theory
1991 - 2013
Edited by Nichoals Yanneils
from Springer
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Volume 38, issue 3 , 2009
Symposium on organization, heterogeneity and trade pp. 433-436 Giovanni Facchini and Thierry A. Verdier Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium pp. 437-464 Dalia Marin and Thierry A. Verdier Cultural differences, insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision pp. 465-484 Jiahua Che and Giovanni Facchini Outsourcing of innovation pp. 485-515 Edwin L.-C. Lai , Raymond G. Riezman and Ping Wang Offshoring and product innovation pp. 517-532 Alireza Naghavi and Gianmarco .P. Ottaviano Firm heterogeneity and Ricardian comparative advantage within and across sectors pp. 533-559 Toshihiro Okubo Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer pp. 561-592 Hector Calvo-Pardo Volume 38, issue 2 , 2009
Symposium on: equilibria with asymmetric information pp. 217-219 Dionysius Glycopantis , Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Konrad Podczeck Equilibria in incomplete assets economies with infinite dimensional spot markets pp. 221-262 Charalambos Aliprantis and Rabee Tourky Large economies with differential information and without free disposal pp. 263-286 Laura Angeloni and V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha Elimination of arbitrage states in asymmetric information models pp. 287-293 Bernard Cornet and Lionel Boisdeffre Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states pp. 295-320 Carlos Hervés-Beloso , V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Paulo Klinger Monteiro A market game approach to differential information economies pp. 321-330 Guadalupe Fugarolas-Alvarez-Ude , Carlos Hervés-Beloso , Emma Moreno-García and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies pp. 331-350 Giovanna Bimonte and Maria Gabriella Graziano On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium pp. 351-369 Dionysius Glycopantis , Allan Muir and Nicholas Yannelis Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information pp. 371-383 Claudia Meo Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium pp. 385-397 Erik J. Balder and Nicholas Yannelis On purification of measure-valued maps pp. 399-418 Konrad Podczeck Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents pp. 419-432 Nicholas Yannelis Volume 38, issue 1 , 2009
Introduction to the Symposium pp. 1-7 George Deltas Auctions with a buy price pp. 9-39 Stanley Reynolds and John Wooders Auctions with costly information acquisition pp. 41-72 Jacques Crémer , Yossi Spiegel and Charles Zheng Auction design with opportunity cost pp. 73-103 Jingfeng Lu Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints pp. 105-124 Sandro Brusco and Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect pp. 125-135 Simon Board Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option pp. 137-168 Subir Bose and Arup Daripa Biased procurement auctions pp. 169-185 Leonardo Bandeira Rezende Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices pp. 187-216 Robert Zeithammer Volume 37, issue 3 , 2008
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games pp. 357-394 Luca Anderlini , Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy pp. 395-416 Erwan Quintin On the nonexistence of recursive equilibrium in stochastic OLG economies pp. 417-437 Alessandro Citanna and Paolo Siconolfi Consumption externalities: a representative consumer model when agents are heterogeneous pp. 439-467 Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa and Stephen J Turnovsky Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials pp. 469-490 Philippe Jehiel , Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Benny Moldovanu Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models pp. 491-507 Pascal Billand , Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents pp. 509-519 Harold Houba and Quan Wen Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information pp. 521-532 Haifeng Fu A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games pp. 533-542 Bertrand Tchantcho and Lawrence Diffo Lambo Volume 37, issue 2 , 2008
On the completeness of complete markets pp. 171-201 P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Kirsten .M. Rohde Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model pp. 203-241 Subir Bose , Gerhard Orosel , Marco Ottaviani and Lise Vesterlund On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships pp. 243-265 Frank Gigler and Thomas Hemmer Petty corruption pp. 267-280 Seung Han Yoo An ascending double auction pp. 281-306 Michael Peters and Sergei Severinov Task scheduling and moral hazard pp. 307-320 Tymofiy Mylovanov and Patrick W. Schmitz Existence of solutions in continuous-time optimal growth models pp. 321-333 Hippolyte d’Albis , Pascal Gourdel and Cuong Le Van Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game pp. 335-345 Rodrigo Harrison and Roberto Muñoz Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations pp. 347-356 Toyotaka Sakai Volume 37, issue 1 , 2008
General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection pp. 1-29 Aldo Rustichini and Paolo Siconolfi Optimal balanced growth in a general multi-sector endogenous growth model with constant returns pp. 31-49 Harutaka Takahashi Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game pp. 51-80 Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies pp. 81-98 Toshiyuki Hirai The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition pp. 99-118 Camelia Bejan Preferences over location-scale family pp. 119-146 Wing-Keung Wong and Chenghu Ma Nash equilibria with Knightian uncertainty; the case of capacities pp. 147-159 Dionysius Glycopantis and Allan Muir On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes pp. 161-169 Sunanda Roy and Tarun Sabarwal
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