Non-dictatorial extensive social choice

Erwin Ooghe () and Luc Lauwers ()

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 25, issue 3, pages 721-743

Abstract: Different social planners may have different opinions on the well-being of individuals under different social options (Roberts, 1980). If utilities are translation- or ratio-scale measurable, or if the social ranking might be incomplete, or if interplanner comparability is allowed; then there exist non-dictatorial aggregation rules. We propose extensions, intersections, and mixtures of the Pareto, utilitarian, leximin, Kolm-Pollak, and iso-elastic rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Extensive social choice; Opinion aggregation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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