symposium articles: Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence
Arlington Walton Williams (),
John O. Ledyard (),
Steven Gjerstad () and
Vernon L. Smith ()
Additional contact information John O. Ledyard: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, 228 - 77, California Institute of Technology,Pasadena, CA 91125, USA
Vernon L. Smith: Economics Science Laboratory, McClelland Hall 116, University of Arizona,Tuscon, AZ 85721, USA
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Vernon Smith and
Vernon L. Smith
Abstract:
We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings functions defined over the two traded goods, with a fiat money expenditure constraint. Sellers receive independent marginal cost arrays for each commodity. Parameters for buyers' earnings functions and sellers' costs are set to yield a stable, competitive equilibrium. In spite of the complexity introduced by the demand interdependence, the competitive model is a good predictor of market outcomes, although prices tend to be above (below) the competitive prediction in the low-price (high-price) market.
Keywords:Induced utility; General equilibrium; Double auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:C92D44D51D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2000-08-11 Note: Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: June 7, 1999