Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria

Prabal Roy Chowdhury () and Kunal Sengupta ()

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 24, issue 2, pages 307-324

Abstract: This paper examines the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a Bertrand model of price competition where firms supply all demand. When firms are asymmetric we prove existence and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. For symmetric firms, we show that an equilibrium is necessarily unique. We also examine whether this unique equilibrium outcome is implementable through a sequential move game where the firms take turns at announcing prices. Finally we examine the limiting property of such equilibria as the number of firms go to infinity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Bertrand oligopoly; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Implementation; Folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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