On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly

Francesco Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 25, issue 2, pages 477-486

Abstract: We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Plurality rule; Regular equilibria; Stable sets. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: ON THE GENERIC STRATEGIC STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IF VOTING IS COSTLY (2002)
Working Paper: On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly (2003)
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