Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Nicolas Sahuguet () and Nicola Persico

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 28, issue 1, pages 95-124

Abstract: We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Campaign spending regulation; Redistributive politics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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