Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result

Frank Riedel () and Elmar Wolfstetter ()

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 29, issue 3, pages 721-726

Keywords: Simultaneous ascending–bid auction; Weak dominance; Multi–unit auctions; Game theory; D44; D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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