The private value single item bisection auction

Elena Grigorieva (), P. Jean-Jacques Herings (), Rudolf Müller and Dries Vermeulen

Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 30, issue 1, pages 107-118

Keywords: Single item auction; Weakly dominant strategy; Extensive form games of incomplete information; Information revelation; Binary search; C72; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: The private value single item bisection auction (2007)
Working Paper: The private value single item bisection auction (2002)
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