The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play

Steven Gjerstad ()

Economic Theory, 1995, vol. 7, issue 1, pages 161-178

Abstract: The rate of convergence to Nash equilibrium of continuous fictitious play is determined for a generic set of utilities and initial beliefs in 2 þ 2 games. In addition, an example is provided comparing the rate of convergence of discrete fictitious play to the rate for continuous fictitious play. Finally, the convergent dynamic of fictitious play is related to the nonconvergent gradient process dynamic in 2 þ 2 games.

Date: 1995 Written
Note: Received: June 10, 1994; revised version July 27, 1994

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Journal Article: The Rate of Convergence of Continuous Fictitious Play (1996)
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