International Journal of Game Theory

1986 - 2009

Edited by W. Thomson

from Springer
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Volume 38, issue 3, 2009

An NTU value under complement reduced game pp. 305-324

Yan-An Hwang

The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation pp. 325-348

Yuji Fujinaka and Toyotaka Sakai

Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions pp. 349-366

Flavio Menezes and Matthew Ryan

Pursuit–Evasion Games with incomplete information in discrete time pp. 367-376

Ori Gurel-Gurevich

Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem pp. 377-394

Steve Alpern and Shmuel Gal

Existence of pure Nash equilibria in discontinuous and non quasiconcave games pp. 395-410

Bich Philippe

Credible deviations from signaling equilibria pp. 411-430

Péter Eső and James Schummer

Strategy-proof coalition formation pp. 431-452

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez

Volume 38, issue 2, 2009

Learning of winning strategies for terminal games with linear-size memory pp. 155-168

Thomas Böhme, Frank Göring, Zsolt Tuza and Herwig Unger

Periodic stopping games pp. 169-181

Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi

Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way pp. 183-191

Yves Breitmoser

Note on universal conditional consistency pp. 193-207

Yuichi Noguchi

On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information pp. 209-219

Yaron Azrieli

Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space pp. 221-247

Ross Cressman

Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an n-player prisoners’ dilemma pp. 249-261

Noritsugu Nakanishi

Stochastic games on a product state space: the periodic case pp. 263-289

János Flesch, Gijs Schoenmakers and Koos Vrieze

On the core of routing games with revenues pp. 291-304

Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm, Marc Meertens and Hans Reijnierse

Volume 38, issue 1, 2009

Letter from the Editor pp. 1-2

Shmuel Zamir

Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games pp. 3-16

Camelia Bejan and Juan Camilo Gomez

Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems pp. 17-21

Onur Kesten

Robust dynamic cooperative games pp. 23-36

D. Bauso and J. Timmer

A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium pp. 37-49

Joseph Halpern

Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation pp. 51-79

Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Rahmi İlkılıç

The role of utility interdependence in public good experiments pp. 81-106

Dmitry Shapiro

A characterization of Kruskal sharing rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 107-126

Leticia Lorenzo and Silvia Lorenzo-Freire

On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium pp. 127-136

Edward John Cartwright and Myrna Wooders

On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players pp. 137-153

Edward John Cartwright and Myrna Wooders

Volume 37, issue 4, 2008

Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining pp. 457-474

Juan Vidal-Puga

Separable and low-rank continuous games pp. 475-504

Noah Stein, Asuman Ozdaglar and Pablo Parrilo

Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes pp. 505-523

Naoki Watanabe and Shigeo Muto

A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining pp. 525-532

Tomohiko Kawamori

Random marginal and random removal values pp. 533-563

Emilio Calvo

An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games pp. 565-580

Javier Arin, Jeroen Kuipers and Dries Vermeulen

Existence of optimal strategies in Markov games with incomplete information pp. 581-596

Abraham Neyman

Inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions pp. 597-618

M. Hinojosa, A. Mármol and J. Zarzuelo

Volume 37, issue 2, 2008

Nearly serial sharing methods pp. 155-184

Yves Sprumont

Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment–dominance relations pp. 185-201

Takuya Masuzawa

On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core pp. 203-210

Nizar ALLOUCH and Arkadi Predtetchinski

On coordination games with quantum correlations pp. 211-218

Vladislav Kargin

Stochastic limit-average games are in EXPTIME pp. 219-234

Krishnendu Chatterjee, Rupak Majumdar and Thomas Henzinger

Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core pp. 235-249

Milan Horniaček

On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions pp. 251-264

Younghwan In

On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution pp. 265-279

Jacob Engwerda and Rudy Douven

Network search games with immobile hider, without a designated searcher starting point pp. 281-302

Steve Alpern, Vic Baston and Shmuel Gal

On eligibility by the de Borda voting rules pp. 303-305

V. Kiselev

Volume 36, issue 3, 2008

A collection of papers dedicated to David Gale on the occasion of his 85th birthday pp. 317-319

Marilda Sotomayor

Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help? pp. 321-331

Georgy Artemov

The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems pp. 333-352

Péter Biró, Katarína Cechlárová and Tamás Fleiner

Proportional pie-cutting pp. 353-367

Steven J. Brams, Michael Jones and Christian Klamler

Welfare and stability in senior matching markets pp. 369-392

David Cantala and Francisco Sánchez

Core-selecting package auctions pp. 393-407

Robert Day and Paul Milgrom

Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures pp. 409-420

Kimmo Eriksson and Olle Häggström

Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences pp. 421-440

Kimmo Eriksson, Jonas Sjöstrand and Pontus Strimling

Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games pp. 441-460

Sergiu Hart

Random paths to P-stability in the roommate problem pp. 461-471

E. Inarra, C. Larrea and E. Molis

Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration pp. 473-488

Fuhito Kojima and M. Utku Ünver

Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts pp. 489-496

Mihai Manea

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles pp. 497-518

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Masso, Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo

A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion pp. 519-535

Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak and Uriel Rothblum

Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions pp. 537-569

Alvin Roth

A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity pp. 571-585

Uzi Segal and Joel Sobel

Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents pp. 587-619

Konstantinos Serfes

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules pp. 621-640

Marilda Sotomayor

Volume 36, issue 2, 2007

Preface to the special issue on the occasion of the first Spain Italy Netherlands meeting on Game theory (SING 1) pp. 147-147

Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

Project games pp. 149-176

Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm and Herbert Hamers

Fair and efficient student placement with couples pp. 177-207

Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn

The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games pp. 209-222

J. Bilbao, J. Fernández, N. Jiménez and J. López

The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 223-239

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Vidal-Puga

Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets pp. 241-257

Victor Domansky

On the convergence of the random arrival rule in large claims problems pp. 259-273

Youngsub Chun and Junghoon Lee

Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games pp. 275-299

Zafer Akin

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem pp. 301-316

Olivier Bochet

Volume 36, issue 1, 2007

On some families of cooperative fuzzy games pp. 1-15

Yaron Azrieli and Ehud Lehrer

A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market pp. 17-26

Josep Izquierdo, Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center pp. 27-46

Julio González-Díaz and Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez

The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense pp. 47-55

André Casajus

Congestion games revisited pp. 57-83

Nikolai S. Kukushkin

Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills pp. 85-106

Akira Yamada and Naoki Yoshihara

A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes pp. 107-117

Alexander Zimper

Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium pp. 119-135

Edward John Cartwright

Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games pp. 137-146

Kevin Hasker