International Journal of Game Theory

1986 - 2008

Edited by W. Thomson

from Springer
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Volume 37, issue 2, 2008

Nearly serial sharing methods pp. 155-184

Yves Sprumont

Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment–dominance relations pp. 185-201

Takuya Masuzawa

On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core pp. 203-210

Nizar Allouch and Arkadi Predtetchinski

On coordination games with quantum correlations pp. 211-218

Vladislav Kargin

Stochastic limit-average games are in EXPTIME pp. 219-234

Krishnendu Chatterjee, Rupak Majumdar and Thomas Henzinger

Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core pp. 235-249

Milan Horniaček

On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions pp. 251-264

Younghwan In

On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution pp. 265-279

Jacob Engwerda and Rudy Douven

Network search games with immobile hider, without a designated searcher starting point pp. 281-302

Steve Alpern, Vic Baston and Shmuel Gal

On eligibility by the de Borda voting rules pp. 303-305

V. Kiselev

Volume 36, issue 3, 2008

A collection of papers dedicated to David Gale on the occasion of his 85th birthday pp. 317-319

Marilda Sotomayor

Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help? pp. 321-331

Georgy Artemov

The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems pp. 333-352

Péter Biró, Katarína Cechlárová and Tamás Fleiner

Proportional pie-cutting pp. 353-367

Steven Brams, Michael Jones and Christian Klamler

Welfare and stability in senior matching markets pp. 369-392

David Cantala and Francisco Sánchez

Core-selecting package auctions pp. 393-407

Robert Day and Paul Milgrom

Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures pp. 409-420

Kimmo Eriksson and Olle Häggström

Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences pp. 421-440

Kimmo Eriksson, Jonas Sjöstrand and Pontus Strimling

Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games pp. 441-460

Sergiu Hart

Random paths to P-stability in the roommate problem pp. 461-471

E. Inarra, C. Larrea and E. Molis

Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration pp. 473-488

Fuhito Kojima and M. Utku Ünver

Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts pp. 489-496

Mihai Manea

On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles pp. 497-518

Ruth Martínez, Jordi Masso, Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo

A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion pp. 519-535

Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak and Uriel Rothblum

Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions pp. 537-569

Alvin Roth

A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity pp. 571-585

Uzi Segal and Joel Sobel

Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents pp. 587-619

Konstantinos Serfes

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules pp. 621-640

Marilda Sotomayor

Volume 36, issue 2, 2007

Preface to the special issue on the occasion of the first Spain Italy Netherlands meeting on Game theory (SING 1) pp. 147-147

Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

Project games pp. 149-176

Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm and Herbert Hamers

Fair and efficient student placement with couples pp. 177-207

Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn

The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games pp. 209-222

J. Bilbao, J. Fernández, N. Jiménez and J. López

The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 223-239

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Vidal-Puga

Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets pp. 241-257

Victor Domansky

On the convergence of the random arrival rule in large claims problems pp. 259-273

Youngsub Chun and Junghoon Lee

Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games pp. 275-299

Zafer Akin

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem pp. 301-316

Olivier Bochet

Volume 36, issue 1, 2007

On some families of cooperative fuzzy games pp. 1-15

Yaron Azrieli and Ehud Lehrer

A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market pp. 17-26

Josep Izquierdo, Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center pp. 27-46

Julio González-Díaz and Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez

The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense pp. 47-55

André Casajus

Congestion games revisited pp. 57-83

Nikolai S. Kukushkin

Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills pp. 85-106

Akira Yamada and Naoki Yoshihara

A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes pp. 107-117

Alexander Zimper

Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium pp. 119-135

Edward John Cartwright

Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games pp. 137-146

Kevin Hasker

Volume 35, issue 4, 2007

The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology pp. 465-492

Adam Brandenburger

Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies pp. 493-503

Yong-Hui Zhou, Jian Yu and Shu-Wen Xiang

Formation of segregated and integrated groups pp. 505-519

Alison Watts

All in good time pp. 521-538

Aviad Heifetz and Clara Ponsati

The gamma-core and coalition formation pp. 539-556

Parkash Chander

The Shapley value of exact assignment games pp. 557-568

Maike Hoffmann and Peter Sudhölter

A superadditive solution for cephoidal bargaining problems pp. 569-590

Diethard Pallaschke and Joachim Rosenmüller

Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games pp. 591-602

Klaus Kultti and Hannu Salonen

Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core pp. 603-615

Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels

Volume 35, issue 3, 2007

Rational ignorance and voting behavior pp. 315-335

Cesar Martinelli

On participation games with complete information pp. 337-352

Tasos Kalandrakis

Protests and reputation pp. 353-377

Lucia Buenrostro, Amrita Dhillon and Myrna Wooders

The welfare effects of public opinion polls pp. 379-394

Esteban F. Klor and Eyal Winter

Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques pp. 395-426

L. Hernández-Lamoneda, R. Juárez and F. Sánchez-Sánchez

Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation pp. 427-453

David McAdams

Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules pp. 455-464

José Carlos Rodríguez Alcantud and Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Volume 35, issue 2, 2007

Government formation in a two dimensional policy space pp. 151-184

Enriqueta Aragonès

Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core pp. 185-204

Anna Bogomolnaia, Michel Breton, Alexei Savvateev and Shlomo Weber

Rationally constructing the dimensions of the political sphere pp. 205-221

Michael Chwe

Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties pp. 223-249

Andrei Gomberg, Francisco Marhuenda and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín

Communication and bargaining in the spatial model pp. 251-266

Adam Meirowitz

A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria pp. 267-286

Francesco Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni

Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule pp. 287-314

Matthias Messner and Mattias Polborn

Volume 35, issue 1, 2006

The calculus of ethical voting pp. 1-25

Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni

Approval voting: three examples pp. 27-38

Francesco De Sinopoli, Bhaskar Dutta and Jean-François Laslier

Repeated Downsian electoral competition pp. 39-69

John Duggan and Mark Fey

Memetics and voting: how nature may make us public spirited pp. 71-90

John Conley, Ali Toossi and Myrna Wooders

Majority voting leads to unanimity pp. 91-110

Geir B. Asheim, Carl Andreas Claussen and Tore Nilssen

A simple “market value” bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems pp. 111-128

Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, Scott Feld, Bernard Grofman and Leonard Ray

Naive audience and communication bias pp. 129-150

Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani