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A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion

Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak and Uriel Rothblum ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, vol. 36, issue 3, pages 519-535

Keywords: Dormitory placement; Matchings; Stable matchings; Deferred acceptance algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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