Best response dynamics for role games

Ulrich Berger ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, vol. 30, issue 4, pages 527-538

Abstract: In a role game, players can condition their strategies on their player position in the base game. If the base game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, the set of Nash equilibria of the role game is globally asymptotically stable under the best response dynamics. If the base game is 2 ×2, then in the cyclic case the set of role game equilibria is a continuum. We identify a single equilibrium in this continuum that attracts all best response paths outside the continuum.

Keywords: Role; Games; ·; Best; Response; Dynamics; ·; Learning; ·; Evolution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-27
Note: Received: June 2001
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