Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities

Nikolai S. Kukushkin, Satoru Takahashi () and Tetsuo Yamamori ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, vol. 33, issue 2, pages 229-238

Keywords: nash equilibrium; better response dynamics; best response dynamics; game with strategic complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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