A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity

International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, vol. 33, issue 3, pages 335-354

Keywords: Plurality; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Restricted efficiency; Anonymity; Division indifference; Separable preferences; D70; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005

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Working Paper: A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity (2005)
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