The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems

Péter Biró (), Katarína Cechlárová () and Tamás Fleiner ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, vol. 36, issue 3, pages 333-352

Keywords: Stable marriage problem; Stable roommates problem; Matching mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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