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Welfare and stability in senior matching markets

David Cantala () and Francisco Sánchez ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, vol. 36, issue 3, pages 369-392

Keywords: Matching; Core consistency; Status-quo stability; Weakened stability; Branch and bound algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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