Core-selecting package auctions

Robert Day () and Paul Milgrom ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, vol. 36, issue 3, pages 393-407

Keywords: Core; Stable matching; Marriage problem; Auctions; Core-selecting auctions; Menu auctions; Proxy auctions; Package bidding; Combinatorial bidding; Incentives; Truncation strategies; D44; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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